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TAXATION OF PROFESSIONAL
FIRMS AS CORPORATIONS
Louis MAIER AND NELSON H. WILD*
THE PROBLEM
In the selection of a form of business organization, the professional
man encounters rather formidable disadvantages as compared to the
ordinary businessman. Legal and ethical restrictions may prevent him
from choosing the most advantageous form of organization. Thus,
although the size of a medical partnership or law firm may be such
that the corporate advantages of centralized management and continu-
ity of existence are desirable, as a general rule, corporations cannot
engage in the practice of medicine or law.1 Ethical considerations make
the personal relationship of the professional man and his client para-
mount, and it is felt that the interposition of a corporation might ad-
versely affect this professional relationship. 2
In addition, while the authors believe that the different forms of
business organization should be accorded the same tax treatment with
the result that the election of one form over another will not depend
on the tax results obtained, such is not the case. The tax tail is often
so important that it wags the dog as to the selection of the proper
form of organization. Tax-wise, there is a rather severe discrimina-
*Louis Maier, of the Wisconsin and Minnesota Bars, is associated with Groote-
maat, Cook and Franke. He holds a B.S. in Business Administration from
Marquette University and an L.L.B. from the University of Wisconsin. He is
an advisory member of the Tax Committee of the Milwaukee County Bar
Association.
Nelson H. Wild was formerly a member of the Marquette Law Review Staff.
141 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons, §20 (1942); 5 Am.Jur.AttorneysatLaw,
§25 (1936). There is a small minority that permits corporations to practice
medicine. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N.W.
1078 (1905) and State Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103
N.W. 1079 (1905) ; State ex rel. Sager v. Lewin, 128 M'X\o. App. 149, 106 S.W.
581 (1907); Doumitt v. Diemer, 144 Ore. 36, 23 P. 2d 918 (1933). Further,
in some states it may be possible for a corporation to engage in the practice
of dentistry or optometry. 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons, §28 (1942)
People v. United States Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157, 103 A.L.R.
1229 (1936) and annotations at 103 A.L.R. 1240. On the other hand, there
appears to be no authority contrary to the rule prohibiting corporations from
practicing law.
2 "... the principal evils attendant upon corporate practice of medicine spring
from the conflict between the professional standards and obligations of the
doctors and the profit motive of the corporation employer." People v. Pacific
Health Corp., 12 Cal. 2d 156, 82 P. 2d 429,431 (1938).
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tion against the professional man and the sole proprietor, although the
latter is free to adopt a different form of organization to avoid some
of these adverse tax effects. Among the tax disadvantages of a partner-
ship or sole proprietorship are the following:
1. The professional man is not able to include himself in a deferred
retirement plan, whereby the amounts set aside each year for his benefit
would be deductible and the earnings would be tax free until such
time as they are taken out after retirement.3
2. Although he may deduct the premiums on group insurance for
his employees, he may not deduct the premium for insurance on his
own life or for health and accident insurance on himself.4
3. Since he is not an "employee," a self employed doctor cannot
obtain social security. 5
To meet these problems imaginative planners for a long time have
tried to come up with plans which provide comparable advantages for
the professional man and which are still compatible with his profes-
sional status. The purpose of this article is to examine several of the
types of organizations that are available to the men of the medical
and legal professions and to analyze their feasibility under the present
law.
METHODS OF OBTAINING TAX EQUALITY FOR PROFESSIONAL MEN
The keystone provision defining a corporation for purposes of tax-
ation is Section 7701(3) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, which
states: "(3) Corporation-The term 'corporation' includes associations,
joint stock companies and insurance companies." This provision under
the 1954 Code is identical to that found in the 1939 Code. Thus, Regu-
lations 118, Sec. 39.3797-2 and -3 under the 1939 Code will control
until such time as the proposed regulations6 under the 1954 Code, pub-
lished on December 23, 1959, become final. These proposed regulations
state in part:
The term 'corporation' is not limited to the artificial entity usu-
ally known as a corporation, but includes also an association, a
trust classed as an association because of its nature or its activi-
ties, a joint stock company, and an insurance company.7
It would appear from the regulations that there are three forms of
organization which are available to a group of professional people who
would like to obtain organizational and employee benefits similar to
those available to corporate employees and executives. These are the
3 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §401 (a).
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §261. Premiums on a medical policy are deductible
as a medical expense to the extent that they do not cover income disability
provisions. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §213 (e) (1).




TAXATION OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS
joint stock company, the common law or business trust, and the asso-
ciation.
THE JOINT STOCK COMPANY 8
However, it is doubtful that the joint stock company would be
acceptable, since it is the closest of the three to the pure corporation.
To the writers' knowledge no attempt has been made to use a joint
stock company for this purpose. Since there is no precedent, its use
would involve risk of litigation. Therefore, no further consideration
will be given to that form of organization in this article.
THE COMMON LAW TRUST
The common law trust, sometimes known as the business trust
or the Massachusetts business trust, differs from the ordinary trust
in that in the former there is a joint venture for the purpose of doing
business and dividing the profits, whereas the purpose of the latter is
primarily to conserve property. 9 Nevertheless, the means of setting up
both forms of trust are often similar. The common law trust undoubt-
edly was favored by many planners because there already had been
developed a considerable body of law in respect to the form and legal
incidents of such an organization. Furthermore, it apparently was felt
originally that the business trust was taxable as an ordinary trust and
not as a corporation, although this thought was quickly disspelled in
Morrissey v. United States and its companion cases.' 0 Nevertheless,
this form of organization is well adapted for the use of a professional
group which wishes to take advantage of corporate taxation without
being a corporation.
In Wisconsin, however, there are some distinct disadvantages to
the use of a business trust. First, the Wisconsin Blue Sky Laws apply
to the common law trust, so that if the total number of holders of
beneficial interests exceeds fifteen, the beneficial interests must be
registered." Second, if the declaration of trust is issued to five or more
persons, or if it is proposed to sell beneficial interests or certificates
sUnder the law of at least some states, the Association form of organization
which is described later on in this Memorandum probably meets the definition
of a Joint Stock Company. For a case giving a good description of a joint
Stock Company, see Hammond et al v. Otwell et al 170 Ga. 832, 154 S.E. 357
(1930).
9 Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 357, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9020 (1935).
"In what are called 'business trusts' the object is not to hold and conserve par-
ticular property, with incidental powers, as in the traditional types of trusts,
but to provide a medium for the conduct of a business and sharing its
gains ....
lOIbid; Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9021
(1935) ; Helvering v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9023 (1935) ;
Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, 296 U.S. 369, 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
9022 (1935). In all these cases the taxpayer claimed that its business
trust was taxable as an ordinary trust and not as a corporation. The tax-
payer lost in each case when the Court held that a business trust was an as-
sociation taxable as a corporation.
3" Wis. Stats. §189.07(1) (b) (1957).
1960]
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of membership in Wisconsin, the trust instrument must be filed with
the Secretary of State and recorded. 12 There is a filing fee of $25.00
with an additional fee of $1.00 for each one thousand dollars of cer-
tificates sold, or offered for sale, in Wisconsin.13 Because the require-
ment of filing and recording does not apply to associations, it would
seem that the association form of organization would be preferred in
Wisconsin. Thus, there remains for consideration the association tax-
able as a corporation under Section 7701(3).
THE ASSOCIATION
The association does not have a well developed body of law upon
which to depend for precedents. Nevertheless, some experience may be
drawn from the many social groups that have adopted Articles of
Association or a constitution and by-laws for their operation. For court
precedent there have been the recent decisions in the Kintner:" and
Galt" cases, both of which involved associations. In Wisconsin there
has been the relatively long experience with the Sheboygan Clinic,
which has operated under Articles of Association since 1946.
The remaining portion of this article will discuss the attributes of
an association taxable as a corporation in regard to the organization
of medical clinics as developed by case law and as interpreted by the
proposed regulations. In addition, the Appendix contains a sample
form of Articles of Association for unincorporated associations as
prepared by the law department of the American Medical Association.
This appears to be a good basic form although it undoubtedly would
have to be varied to fit the particular situation confronting the at-
torney.
CASES OUTLINING BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AssoCIATIONS
The leading case dealing with organizations which are taxable as
corporations is Morrissey v. Commissioner." The individuals involved
in that situation entered into a declaration of trust and transferred
certain real estate to designated trustees. The trustees sold some of
this land. The remainder was improved by the development of a golf
course and sold to the Western National Golf Club, Inc. in exchange for
its stock. Thereafter, the trustees confined their activities primarily
to the collection of moneys due and the making of distributions to
the beneficiaries. Under the trust instrument the trustees had the
power of sale, to make investments and generally to manage the trust
estate. They could choose their own successors and add to their num-
"2 Wis. Stats. §226.14(1) (1957).
'3 Wis. Stats. §226(3) (1957).
14 Kintner v. United States, 216 F. 2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954). 54-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9636.
15 Gait v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (D.C. Tex. 1959), 59-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9602.
16 Supra note 9.
[Vol. 44
TAXATION OF PROFESSIONAL FIRMS
ber. Beneficial interests in the trust were evidenced by transferable
certificates, but the certificate holders' votes were advisory only. The
trustees were without power to bind the beneficiaries personally by
any act, neglect or default and the death of a trustee or beneficiary
was not to end the trust.
The trustees claimed that this organization was a trust under Sec-
tion 219 of the Revenue Acts of 1924 and 1926, principally because
the beneficiaries had no voice in the management or control over the
trustees. Note that here the individuals involved were trying to avoid
having their organization taxed as a corporation, while the Commis-
sioner was asserting corporate liability on the grounds that this or-
ganization had the attributes of a corporation.
The United States Supreme Court held that this was a business
trust and thus an association taxable as a corporation under the Fed-
eral Tax Law, since the organization had enough of the characteristics
of a corporation so as to be taxed as such. Because the beneficiaries
had planned a common effort and entered into a combination for the
conduct of a business enterprise, the organization was distinguishable
from the ordinary trust.
In the course of its opinion, the Court delineated the characteristics
of a corporation, which if present, would be sufficient to qualify the
organization as an association taxable as a corporation under the
Federal Tax Law, as follows:
1. Associates-The members must be associates in that they must
have entered into a joint enterprise for the purpose of transacting
business.
2. Title-Title to the property acquired in the undertaking would
be held by the organization as an entity and not by the beneficiaries as
individuals.
3. Centralized management-The management is centralized in
persons who have control of the property and who are charged with
the conduct of the enterprise.
4. Continuity of Life-The organization continues without termina-
tion or interruption by the death of the owners of beneficial interests
or by the transfer of beneficial interests.
5. Limited Liability-Personal liability of the participants is lim-
ited to the property involved in the undertaking.
6. Free Transferability of Interests-Beneficial interests may be
transferred without affecting the continuity of life of the enterprise
and the ownership of units of beneficial interest by a large number
of individuals would not cause difficulty.
The Court found that all of the above listed characteristics of a
corporation were present in the business trust under consideration in
the Morrissey case. It further pointed out that certain features usually
1960]
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found in corporations are not essential to a determination that an or-
ganization is an association taxable as a corporation. It is not neces-
sary for the holders of the beneficial interests to have control over the
operation of the business, as it is in the case of a corporation. Further-
more, the absence of particular corporate forms or of the usual termi-
nology of corporations is not determinative. In the three companion cases
the Court pointed out other features that would not be required, thus,
operations may be limited to one project, as a single oil well lease, 1 7
or apartment house; 18 no meetings need be held or records kept;19
the organization need not have an office, by-laws or seal and the num-
ber of beneficiaries may be small. 20
A medical clinic was first before an appellate court in 1936 in the
Pelton case.21 There several Illinois doctors entered into a trust in-
denture whereby they transferred certain equipment to themselves as
trustees. The beneficial interests were represented by transferable
shares, although options to purchase were given other beneficiaries
before any such interest could be sold to outsiders. The trust was
designated "The Pelton Clinic." The beneficiaries were given the
power to fill vacancies among the trustees. Upon the death of a bene-
ficiary, his beneficial interest passed to his wife or other relative, sub-
ject however, to the repurchase option by the trustees or other bene-
ficiaries. The trust was to last ten years, at which time the assets
would be distributed to the then beneficiaries.
The Court here found that all the corporate characteristics men-
tioned in the Morrissey and companion cases were present. It specifi-
cally noted that a corporation could not practice medicine in Illinois - -
but dismissed this obstacle by quoting from the then current regula-
tion :-". . . organizations . . . are associations within the meaning of
the statutes even though under State Law such organizations are tech-
nically partnerships."'23 This case was subsequently cited with approval
by the Courts on the proposition that how an organization is classified
under State law is not controlling for Federal Tax purposes. 24
The first tax case involving an association which was organized
as an association rather than a trust was that of Kintner v. United
States,"5 which was decided in 1954. A group of Montana doctors had
17 Helvering v. Combs, supra note 10.
is Swanson v. Commissioner, supra note 10.
19 Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates, supra note 10.
20 Helvering v. Combs, supra note 10.
21 Pelton v. Commissioner, 82 F. 2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936). 36-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9195.
22 People v. United States Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200 N.E. 157 (1936).
23 Pelton v. Commissioner, supra note 21 at 476.
24 Wholesalers Adjustment Co. v. C.I.R. 88 F. 2d 156. 37-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9109.
(8th Cir. 1937); Commissioner v. Highlands Evanston Lincolnwood Sub-
division, 88 F. 2d 355, 37-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9119 (7th Cir. 1937) ; Burk-Wag-
goner Oil Assn. v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 110, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1143, (1925);
Giant Auto Parts, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 307, 308 (1949).
25 Supra note 14.
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dissolved their partnership and transferred the assets to "The Western
Montana Clinic" in order to operate as an association taxable as a cor-
poration. The association was to continue until the death of the last
survivor of the original members. The articles of association provided
for both senior and junior members and that the business affairs were
to be managed by an executive committee consisting of five indi-
viduals elected by the senior members. Membership was limited to
physicians and surgeons licensed to practice medicine in the State of
Montana. It was provided that only the members were to be liable to
third parties for professional misconduct, and that any indebtedness
incurred by the association through the act of a member, without the
approval of the executive committee, was chargeable to the member
concerned. Furthermore, the articles provided that the death or retire-
ment of a member was not to result in dissolution of the association,
and beneficial interests of members were non-assignable.
Immediately after organization, the Clinic had set up a pension
plan whereby the doctor employees were given credit for their past
service in the partnership in the formula computing the pension bene-
fits. Contributions to this pension plan were deducted by the clinic
when it filed its corporate income tax returns, and it also paid social
security taxes and withholding taxes on each of its members. In addi-
tion, the clinic had set up a reserve fund to cover anticipated operating
expenses for future years. Instead of receiving an interest in the
assets of the Association, each member agreed that upon his death or
withdrawal, he would accept the benefits of a pension plan, the cost
of which was to be borne by the Association.2G
The Commissioner contended that Dr. Kintner and his wife (since
Dr. Kintner filed a joint return) should report his share of the reserve
fund and pension plan contribution by the clinic as part of his in-
come. In deciding the case, the District Court2 7 construed the Morrissey
case and other Circuit Court decisions2 as not requiring that all tests
stated in the Morrissey decisions must be met in each instance. It
found that the Western Montana Clinic more closely resembled a cor-
poration than a partnership for the following reasons:
1. Title to property was held by the organization as an entity;
2. There was continuity of life;
3. There was centralized management;
26 A provision such as this might cause the pension plan to fail to qualify be-
cause not entered into for the exclusive benefit of employees. A buy and sell
agreement funded with life insurance would seem to be a much more prefer-
able method of retiring a member's interest in the assets.
27 107 F. Supp. 976 (D.C. Mont. 1952).
28 C.I.R. v. Brouillard, 70 F. 2d 154 (10th Cir. 1934) ; Bert v. Helvering, 92 F. 2d
491, 495, 37-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9395 (CA-D.C. 1937) where the court stated,
"... the real test is whether the enterprise more clearly resembles in general
form and mode of procedure a corporation than a partnership."
1960]
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4. The beneficial interests were transferable even though subject
to restrictions.
It was conceded that the personal liability feature more closely re-
sembled a partnership than a corporation.
On appeal the Government contended that the District Court de-
cision should be overthrown on the ground that the practice of medi-
cine in the State of Montana is personal and that a corporation could
not practice medicine. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held, how-
ever, that based on the Pelton decision and the Commissioner's own
regulations, the contention of the taxpayers should be upheld. The
Court stated:
It should be added that it would introduce an anarchic element
in Federal taxation if we determine the nature of associations
by State criteria, rather than by said criteria sanctioned by Tax
Law, the regulations and the Courts. It would destroy the
uniformity so essential to a Federal Tax System-a uniformity
which calls for equal treatment of taxpayers, no matter in
which state their activities are carried on, if it would mean that
tax incidents as to taxpayers in the same category would be de-
termined differently according to the law of the state of resi-
dence3
9
The Court allowed the deduction of contributions for the pension
plan and even permitted the past service of the doctors while partners
to be counted in the pension formula. Many attorneys feel that the
allowance of the past service credit probably would not be sustained
by other Courts under the present status of the law. However, such
service might be counted if the Keogh Bill ever becomes lawA0
Approximately two years after the Kintner decision, the Commis-
sioner issued Revenue Ruling 56-23a3 wherein he announced that he
would not follow the Kintner decision in similar fact situations, either
as to the determination that such an organization was an association
or as to the allowance of past service for sole proprietors or partners,
in the computation of benefits under a qualified pension plan. This
ruling was issued at a time when the request for a ruling in respect
to the Sheboygan Clinic was pending in the Commissioner's office, and
was regarded as a refusal to recognize the tax status of the Sheboygan
Clinic or the deduction of contributions under its pension plan.
Revenue Ruling 56-23 was relaxed by the Commissioner in Revenue
29 Supra note 14 at 424. The court distinguished the Mobile Bar Pilots Ass'n. v.
Commissioner, 97 F. 2d 695 (5th Cir. 1938), 38-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 19405 which had
held that due to the personal nature of a pilot's service, an association of
harbor pilots could not be classified as a corporation on the grounds that the
pilots' association did no business except as an agent of its individual mem-
bers, it owned no property, and had no income as an entity.
30 H.R. 10, 86th Cong.
3' 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 598.
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Ruling 57-546. 32 In that Ruling the Commissioner said that he would
not automatically treat an unincorporated association of doctors or
other professionals as if it were a partnership, just because it sets up
a pension plan that includes professional members. He announced that
the usual tests would be applied in determining whether a particular
organization of doctors or other professional groups had more of the
characteristics of a corporation than a partnership. He promised a new
ruling laying down the basic criteria for deciding whether an associ-
ation is taxable as a corporation in the near future. This was followed
by the proposed regulations published on December 23, 1959, which
will be discussed later.
The most recent Court decision in respect to this problem is Gait v.
United States.33 There a group of Texas doctors dissolved their part-
nership and transferred the assets to the newly formed "Southwest
Clinic Association." All of the personnel of the partnership became
employees of the Association. Of the seven associates, the three senior
members each had a 22.22% interest and the combined interests of the
other four members was 33.33%. The associates elected a Board of
Directors who in turn appointed an executive committee of two doc-
tors from the Board to control the details of management. A business
manager was hired who was under the control of the executive com-
mittee. An associate had no specific share of the assets, which were
to be distributed only upon dissolution. Upon retiring at age sixty-five,
an associate would receive one year's salary. Ownership of units of
interest in the association was transferrable, but the other members
had a first option to purchase such units. There was no individual
liability for the indebtedness of the association until all of the associ-
ation's assets had been used first. The association paid social security
and withholding taxes and had filed the usual corporate income tax
return.
The Court found that there were sufficient corporate characteristics
so that the organization was an association taxable as a corporation.
The Court held that although the association met all the requirements
of a corporation under Texas law, the State law did permit doctors to
form an association to do what they otherwise could do as a corpora-
tion. The Court concluded, without citation of any precedent, that
"'... the act of a State can neither raise nor lower the Federal taxes
that may be due by the association by whatever name it may be called
under the laws of a particular State." 34
THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS
Section 7701 (a) (3) of the 1954 Code is identical to Section 3790
32 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 886.
33 Supra note 15.
3' Id. at 362.
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of the 1939 Code. Thus, until new regulations become final under the
1954 Code, the old regulations will remain in force. The old regula-
tions, Reg. 118, Section 39.3797, are undoubtedly based upon the
criteria set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Morrissey case
and subsequent decisions. Two points are of particular interest.
First, the regulations specifically state that for the purposes of
qualification under the Internal Revenue Code, local law is of no im-
portance.3 5 This follows from the Pelton case and the subsequent de-
cisions.
Second, the regulations specifically provide that any organization
created for the transaction of designated affairs, which continues not-
withstanding that its members or participants change, and whose af-
fairs are conducted by a single individual, a committee, a board or
some other group acting in a representative capacity, is included in
the term 'association' as used in the Internal Revenue Code. The regu-
lations specifically state:
It included a voluntary association, a joint stock association or
company, a business trust, a Massachusetts trust, a common law
trust, an inter-insurance exchange operating through an attorney
in fact, a partnership, association and any other type of organi-
zation which is not within the meaning of the Code, a trust or
an estate or a partnership.3 G
The proposed regulations, Section 301.7701, go into more detail
in several respects and give examples of organizations which do and
which do not meet the requirements of an association taxable as a
corporation. Two of these examples concern doctors forming an as-
sociation. In one example the facts illustrate an association which
would be taxable as a corporation, while the other example states that
the organization illustrated would be classified as a partnership.
Section 301.7701-1(b) in referring to the categories into which
organizations fall for purposes of taxation, states-
The tests or standards which are to be applied in determining
the classification in which an organization belongs (whether it
is an association, a partnership, a trust or other taxable entity)
are determined under the Internal Revenue Code.
The standards and tests to be applied are set forth in Sections
301.7701-2 through 301.7701-4. Section 301.7701-1(c) states in part:
Although it is the Internal Revenue Code rather than local law
which establishes the tests or standards which will be applied
in determining the classification in which an organization be-
35 Reg. 118, §39.3797-1. "For the purpose of taxation the Internal Revenue Code
makes its own classification and prescribes its own standards of classification.
Local law is of no importance in this connection."
36 Reg. 118 §39.3797-2.
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longs, local law will govern in determining whether the legal
relationships which have been established in the formation of the
organization are such that the standards are met. Thus, it is local
law which must be applied in determining such matters, as the
relationships of the members of the organization among them-
selves and with the public at large, and the interests of the
members of the organization and its associates.
The above quotation appears to contradict the old regulations which
simply state that "local law is of no importance," and this has caused
concern among some of the commentators.3 7 Yet this should not be
regarded as a change in the present law. The terse statement that
local law was of no importance referred to the standards of classifica-
tions set by the Internal Revenue Code, and not to the question of
whether these standards had been met.38 The relationships of the
parties between themselves and with the public of necessity must be
determined by local law or else there would be no tax uniformity. For
example, assume that an organization in State A provides for con-
tinuity of life in its Articles, and an organization in State B does not.
Assume further that under the local law of State A there can be no
continuity of life regardless of what the Articles of Association state.
If it is assumed that the element of continuity of life will determine
the organization's Federal tax status, it is clear that neither organiza-
tion has this element in actuality and therefore neither should be taxed
as a corporation. Yet, if local law were of no importance in this
respect, the organization in State A would be taxed as a corporation
and one in State B would not. As previously noted,3 9 the Kintner
decision was attempting to seek tax uniformity. Only by interpreting
the language in that case and in the proposed regulations to mean that
local law is of no importance as to the standards, but is determinative
as to whether these standards have been met, can this objective be
obtained.
The proposed regulations Section 301.7701-2 sets out the charac-
teristics of corporations under which an association will be classified
to determine its status for tax purposes. These characteristics are as
follows:
1. Associates.
2. An objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom.
3. Continuity of life.
4. Centralization of management.
7 Hewitt, Proposed Kintner Regulations Opposed at IRS Hearing, 12 J. Taxa-
tion 217 (April 1960); Nolan, A Tumult in the Industry, XIV J. Am. Soc'y
C.L.U. 217 (Summer 1960). 606 CCH 1960 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 8770A and
8973; Saltz, Associations, 38 Taxes 187 (March 1960).
38 Supra note 35.
39 See page 133 of this article.
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5. Liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property.4 0
6. Free transferability of interests.
ASSOCIATES AND OBJECTIVE TO CARRY ON BUSINESS
The regulations point out that associates and an objective to carry
on business and divide the gains therefrom are essential to all business
organizations other than sole proprietorships and the so-called one-man
corporations. Without both of these characteristics, no organization
would be classified as one taxable as a corporation.
41
CONTINUITY OF LIFE
The characteristic of continuity of life is not present if the death,
insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation or expulsion of a mem-
ber will cause dissolution of the organization.
In determining whether any member has the power of dissolution,
the regulations state it will be necessary to examine the agreement
and to ascertain the effect of such an agreement under local law. The
difficulty to the commentators42 on this subject arises out of the pro-
visions in the Uniform Partnership Act, which are embodied in Section
123.26 of the Wisconsin Statutes relating to causes of dissolution.
The particular language in point reads as follows:
"Dissolution is caused . . . (4) By the death of any partner."
Taken alone, this provision would indicate that the death of a partner
causes dissolution of the partnership, irrespective of a provision in
the agreement to the contrary. Under this interpretation a partnership
under local law could not achieve continuity of life, and would be
seriously hampered in attempting to be classified as an association
taxable as a corporation. Such interpretation appears erroneous both
in Wisconsin and under the Uniform Partnership Act generally.
As early as 1854 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Shields v.
40 Enforcement of liability against unincorporated associations is provided for
in Wisconsin by Chap. 226, §15, Laws of 1959 (Wis. Stats. §262.06 (7) 1959)
which states, "A summons may be served individually upon any officer or
director known to the plaintiff of an unincorporated association . . . where
the claim sued upon arises out of or relates to association activities within
the state sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction . . . . A
judgment rendered under such circumstances is a binding adjudication against
the association as to its assets anywhere." See Smith, Enforcing a Contractual
Claim Against An Unincorporated Association in Wisconsin, 1960 Wis. L.
Rev. 444 (1960).
41 The Morrissey case appears to treat these two characteristics as one, but a
separation may be made. Thus, "associates" signifies an individual closely
connected or joined with others in a common purpose, activity or re-
sponsibility to partake or share in a common design, and implies participation
by each of the individuals so united in the achievement of a common pur-
pose. Weir v. U.S., 92 F. 2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1937). If the "common purpose"
were merely to manage and conserve property for the benefit of the associates,
it would be an ordinary trust even though the beneficiaries of the trust are
the persons who create it. Prop. Reg. 301.7701-4. If the "common purpose"
is to carry on business and divide the gains, then the trust is a business trust.
42 Supra note 37.
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Fuller 43 held that the death of one of the partners caused dissolution
of the partnership. This rule was further developed in Moore v. May44
where it was held that if the Articles of Partnership of a trade associ-
ation provided that any member might withdraw in a manner pre-
scribed, and if it was apparent that the intention of the firm was to
consist of many members and continue for an indefinite period, the
firm was not dissolved by the death of a member. Nor does it appear
that the subsequent adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act changed
this rule. In several jurisdictions subject to the Act where the question
has arisen, the courts have held that death dissolves the partnership
only if the articles of the organization do not provide to the contrary.41
In light of Moore v. May and the statutory provision" that the Act
shall be interpreted "to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it," a similar decision could be expected in Wisconsin.
CENTRALIZATION OF MANAGEMENT
The next requirement is centralization of management. Citing as
authority the Morrissey case, the regulations specifically provide that
persons who hold management authority need not necessarily hold
office as a result of selection by the members, and state that they may
even be self perpetuated in office. However, there would not be cen-
tralized management where the centralized authority is merely to per-
form ministerial acts as an agent at the direction of a principal.
LIMITED LIABILITY
In respect to the characteristic of limited liability, personal liability
is defined to cover the situation where a creditor of the organization
may seek personal satisfaction from a member of the organization to
the extent the assets of the corporation are insufficient to satisfy the
claim. There is an interesting statement in the proposed regulation to
the effect that personal liability does not exist when the members who
are personally liable have risked no substantial assets. This novel test
does not appear to be based upon existing law.
FREELY TRANSFERABLE INTERESTS
Although one of the listed characteristics is transferability of
interests, organizations are not precluded from restricting transferabil-
ity. Thus, the proposed regulations specifically permit a requirement
that a member can only transfer his interest to a non-member after
having offered such interest to other members at its fair market value.
In the case of corporations greater restrictions are permitted. It would
43 4 Wis. 102 (1854).
44117 Wis. 192, 94 N.W. 45 (1903).
45 Gerding v. Bajer, 123 Me. 264, 122 AUt. 675 (1923) ; Storer v. Ripley, 12 Misc.
2d 662, 178 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1958) ; Abel v. O'Hearn, 97 Cal. App. 2d 747, 218 P.
2d 827 (1950) ; McClennen v. C.I.R., 131 F. 2d 165 (1st Cir. 1942).
46 Wis. Stats. §123.02 (4).
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seem that similar restrictions should be allowable in the case of associ-
ations taxable as corporations.
The characteristics listed in the regulations are followed by seven
examples illustrating the applicability of the characteristics in specific
situations. One gathers from the examples that it is not necessary that
each organization fully meet the letter of each of the six listed char-
acteristics, although the requirement as to associates and objective to
carry on business for profit must be present in all cases. Thus, in the
first example, the organization illustrated did not have the character-
istic of limited liability, but it did have the characteristic of centralized
management, continuity of life and a modified form of transferability
of interests. That organization was qualified as an association for pur-
poses of the Internal Revenue Code.
A rather extensive discussion of the problem was made in an Office
Memorandum issued in April of 1960 by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to the District Director at Milwaukee in respect to the She-
boygan Clinic. The Office Memorandum discusses first the facts, then
the application of the existing law, but most interesting is the de-
termination of the Commissioner which is found on pages 7 and 8
of this Memorandum. We are setting this determination out in full
below.4
7
Under the Articles of Association of Sheboygan Clinic, now
in effect a number of individuals have joined together for a
common purpose, i.e. for the furnishing of medical, surgical,
dental and optometry services to the general public in the City
of Sheboygan and surrounding area, and the sharing of any
profits arising from such activities.
Since Article XXV of the Articles of Association specifically
provides that neither the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire-
ment, resignation, or expulsion of a member shall cause the
dissolution of the association, it is held that such organization
possesses the continuity of life characteristic of a corporation
for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code.
By Article VII of the Articles of Association, management
of the Clinic is vested exclusively in an executive committee
consisting of 5 members. Therefore, it is our position that the
Clinic has centralized management in a representative capacity
characteristic of corporate management which survives the death,
disability, withdrawal or resignation of an officer, director or
stockholder.
Accordingly, based upon the above facts and circumstances
it is concluded that the Sheboygan Clinic should be treated un-
der the agreement now in effect as an association taxable as a
corporation for all purposes of the Internal Revenue Code. It is
47 A copy of this Office Hemorandum has been furnished the writers through
the courtesy of Mr. Jacob F. Federer of Federer, Grote, Hesslink, Rohde
& Neuses of Sheboygan, Wisconsin.
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also now our view that the Clinic should have been treated as
an association taxable as a corporation under the provisions of
both the 1946 and 1948 agreements.
This technical advice memorandum will be of no force and
effect with respect to taxable years of Sheboygan Clinic to
which final regulations promulgated under Section 7701 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 must be applied.
In the last paragraph of the quoted portion, the Commissioner stated
that it will have no force and effect in respect to taxable years to which
final regulations promulgated under Section 7701 of the 1954 Code
must be applied. While this seems to open the door to a contention
that the Regulations under the 1939 Code and proposed regulations
under the 1954 Code are different, it is difficult to see how this can
be so. The statutory language is the same in both the 1939 and 1954
Codes. Courts in at least two instances have passed on medical clinics
set up under that particular language. It does not seem that at this
time the Commissioner can effect a change in the law by effecting a
change in the regulation.
AFTER 1960, WHAT NEXT?
One could scarcely give an analysis of the present status of the law
without at least mentioning in passing proposed changes. The most
publicized proposed legislation in this field is HR-10, usually known
as the Keogh Bill.48 As originally introduced in the House of Repre-
sentatives, this bill would permit self-employed individuals to set up
retirement plans for themselves, subject to certain limitations and
restrictions, which largely were concerned with the rate of contribu-
tions and early withdrawal. This Bill had been introduced in prior
sessions of Congress in substantially similar form to that before the
last session of Congress. In earlier sessions the Treasury Department
alway objected to passage of the Bill on the ground it would result
in a loss of revenue. But in 1960 after the Bill had passed the House
and was under consideration by the Senate Finance Committee, the
Treasury made a rather curious about-face. It then said that it would
withdraw its objection to passage of the Bill if it were amended so
that any pension plan permitted under the provisions of the Bill would
include other employees of the sole proprietor or partner, as well as
the owners of the business on a non-discriminatory basis. In order
to recoup some of the loss of revenue that it otherwise had expected,
it requested that the requirements of present law on qualified pension
plans be tightened up in respect to all small employers to prevent
what it called abuses.
49
48 Supra note 30.
49 "Statement on Alternative Approach to H.R. 10 by David Lindsey, General
Counsel of the Treasury, before the Senate Finance Committee, May 11,
1960, CCH Stand. Fed. Reps. No. 23, Part I, May 18, 1960.
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This Bill as amended by the Finance Committee, was reported out
to the Senate but was not acted upon before adjournment. There was
much objection to the Bill in the form reported by the Senate Finance
Committee, not only because of the restrictions upon new retirement
plans for sole proprietors and partners, but because of the fact that
such restrictions would adversely affect presently adopted pension and
profit sharing plans, and would necessitate drastic and undesirable
amendments to retain qualified status.
This brings us back to our starting point. At the outset it was
stated that as a matter of principle, the tax treatment of the different
forms of business organization should not be so different that the
selection of one form of business organization as compared with an-
other would depend upon the tax results obtained. While we are
skeptical of achieving any Utopia on earth, we do believe that justice
and equaltiy under the law, even the tax law, is a goal to be sought.
In almost every session of Congress, the Ways and Means Committee
starts out by saying that it is going to undertake to close loopholes
and achieve equality of treatment under the tax law. We recognize the
magnitude of the task and the many difficulties involved, but we think
the problem of deferred benefits for small businessmen is a field where
the inequities of the tax law cry out for rectification.
The self employed or the member of a partnership should be af-
forded the same opportunities in respect to deferring compensation
as any corporate executive.50 Just as Section 401(a) (3) (B) prohibits
pension plans which have the effect of discriminating in favor of em-
ployees who are officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly compen-
sated employees, neither should the law discriminate against these
same individuals or against sole proprietors or partners who, due to
the nature of their professional calling, cannot become corporate em-
ployees. The objectives of the Keogh Bill could be attained best
through amendments to Sections 401 through 404 of the Internal
Revenue Code, so that self-employed persons may be permitted to en-
joy the benefits permitted corporate employees and executives under
the present laws relating to qualified pension and profit sharing plans.
Furthermore, the Treasury's requested restrictions as embodied in
the Senate Finance Committee amendments to HR-10 are both un-
necessary and unduly restrictive.
50 We have not overlooked §1361 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which
permits certain partnerships and sole proprietorships to elect to be taxed
as a domestic corporation. The requirement that capital be a material income
producing factor eliminates most professional organizations. Furthermore.
the limitation in §1361(d) that a partner or proprietor shall not be considered
an employee for purposes of §401(a) precludes the objective of becoming
eligible for pension trusts, etc. Beyond this, the election opens up a Pandora's
Box of other problems, with which no professional organization deserves
to be confronted.
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CONCLUSION
Even though the Keogh Bill or similar legislation is enacted in a
future session of Congress, permitting partners or sole proprietors to
set up qualified pension plans under which they are included, continuity
of life, centralized management, and transferability of ownership
interests will continue to make the Common Law Trust and Associ-
ation desirable forms of organization for professional people. It is
hoped that the above analysis has demonstrated that such organiza-




We, the undersigned, individually,
Name Number Street City State
...................... ... ................ °.... ........ ... ....
...................... ....................... ..... •...... ..
...................... °....................... ......o°........,
.... .................. ....................... ...............
being licensed to practice medicine in the State of Wisconsin, for the purpose of
forming an association, do hereby adopt the following Articles of Association:
ARTICLE I
NAME
The name of the association is: MILWAUKEE CLINIC.
ARTICLE II
DuRATIoN
The association shall commence on May 9, 1958, and continue until termi-
nated by unanimous agreement of the associates.
ARTICLE III
PUP'oSE
The purpose for which the association is organized is the practice of medicine
and surgery, medical research, and related activities; provided that only licensed
physicians shall control professional functions; and provided further that the
personal and intimate relationship between physician and patient shall at all
time be maintained inviolate.
ARTICLE IV
OFFICES
The offices of the association shall be located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
ARTICLE V
ASSOCIATES
SECTION 1. QUALIFICATIONS. The members of the association shall be known
as associates. The present associates shall consist of the undersigned. Each
associate shall continue as such until his membership in the association is termi-
nated as herein provided. Associates may elect additional associates to member-
ship and may on the death, resignation, removal or retirement of an associate
elect a successor. The affirmative vote of two-thirds of the associates shall be
required for such purposes. No person shall become an associate unless he is




licensed to practice medicine in the State of Wisconsin and has agreed in writing
to be bound by these articles of association.
SECTION 2. DEATH OR RETIREMENT. The death, resignation, removal or retire-
ment of an associate shall not dissolve the association, and neither a retiring
associate nor the estate or legal representatives of a deceased associate shall
have any right, title or interest in the good will or any other property owned by
the association. He shall be entitled solely to the earned and unpaid salary which
may have accrued to the date of death, resignation, removal or retirement.
Any death benefit, disability allowance or retirement income in which an associ-
ate may share shall be provided through a special fund and plan directly specified
for such purposes and so limited.
SECTION 3. AUTOMATIC RETIREMENT. Each associate shall automatically retire
upon attaining sixty-five years of age unless his term shall be extended with
his approval and by vote of a majority of the associates.
SECTION 4. ANNUAL MEETING. The annual meeting of the associates shall be
held on the first Monday in December in each year, beginning with the year 1958,
at the hour of 7:00 p.m., for the purpose of electing governors and for the
transaction of such other business as may come before the meeting.
SECTION 5. SPECIAL MEETINGS. Special meetings of the associates may be
called by the board of governors or by not less than three associates, providing
written notice of the meeting is mailed or delivered at least five days before
the meeting to all associates. The attendance of an associate at any special
meeting shall constitute a waiver of notice of such meeting.
SECTION 6. PLACE OF 'EETING. All meetings shall be held at the offices of
the association unless all the associates may in writing designate another place
for a particular meeting.
SECTION 7. QUORUMl. A majority of the associates shall constitute a quorum
at any meeting of associates; provided that if less than a majority of the associ-
ates are present at said meeting, a majority of those present may adjourn the
meeting from time to time without further notice.
ARTICLE VI
GOVERNORS
SECTION 1. GENERAL POWERS. The business and affairs of the association shall
be managed by its board of governors.
SECTION 2. NUMBER, TENURE AND QUALIFICATIONS. The board of governors
shall be composed of not less than three nor more than five of the associates.
Each governor shall hold office until the next annual meeting of associates or un-
til his successor shall have been elected and qualified. The first board of governors
shall consist of ............................................................
SECTION 3. REGULAR MEETINGS. A regular meeting of the board of governors
shall be held immediately after and at the same place as the annual meeting of
associates.
SECTION 4. SPECIAL MEETINGS. Special meetings of the board of governors
may be called at the request of any two governors, providing written notice of
the meeting is mailed or delivered at least five days before the meeting to all
of the governors. The attendance of a governor at any special meeting shall
constitute a waiver of notice of such meeting.
SECTION 5. QUORUM. A majority of the board of governors shall constitute a
quorum for transaction of business at any meeting of the board of governors,
provided, that if less than a majority of the governors are present at said meeting,
a majority of the governors present may adjourn the meeting from time to
time without further notice. The act of the majority of governors present at a
meeting at which a quorum is present shall be the act of the board of governors.
ARTICLE VII
OFFICERS
SECTION 1. NUMBER. The officers of the association shall be a chairman, a vice-
chairman, a secretary-treasurer and such other officers as may be elected by the
board of governors from themselves.
SECTION 2. TENURE. The officers of the association shall be elected annually
by the board of governors at the first meeting of the board of governors held
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after each annual meeting of associates. Each officer shall hold office until his
successor shall have been duly elected and qualified or until his death or until
he shall resign or shall have been removed in the manner hereinafter provided.
SECTION 3. REdMOVAL. Any officer elected by the board of governors may be
removed by the board of governors whenever in its judgment the best interests
of the association require such action, but such removal shall be without prejudice
to the contract rights, if any, of the person removed.
SECTION 4. CHAIRMAN. The Chairman shall preside at all meetings of the
associates and board of governors and shall in general supervise the business
and affairs of the association. He shall sign all contracts authorized by the board
of governors and shall perform such other duties as may be prescribed by the
board of governors.
SECTION 5. VICE-CHAIRMAN. The vice-chairman shall perform the duties of
the chairman in the event of his absence, disability or refusal to act.
SECTION 6. SEcRErAR-TREAsuRaR. The secretary-treasurer shall keep the
minutes of the meetings of the associates and the board of governors. He shall
sign and attest all contracts and shall give notices of meetings, when notice shall
be required. He shall have custody of and be responsible for all funds of the
association. He shall open bank accounts and shall deposit or cause to be de-
posited therein all moneys received by the association. He shall sign all checks
and shall cause an annual audit of the affairs of the association to be made by
a certified public accountant. He shall perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the chairman or the board of governors.
ARTICLE VIII
MISCELLANEOUS
SECTION 1. CONTRACTS. Subject to the provisions of Section 2 of this article,
the board of governors may authorize any officer or agent to enter into any con-
tract or execute any instrument in the name of the association, and such authority
may be general or confined to specific instances.
SECTION 2. SALARIES. The board of governors shall determine the salaries and
bonuses paid to physicians and associates employed by the association and shall
approve the terms of all contracts with physicians and associates before such
contracts shall be executed.
SECTION 3. RETIREMENT PLAN. The board of governors shall have the power
to arrange and provide for retirement and other benefits for associates and
other persons employed by the association, including, without limiting the gener-
ality of the foregoing, the power to specify the age of retirement, to adopt a




These articles may be altered, amended or repealed and new articles may be
adopted at any meeting of the board of governors by a majority vote of all of
the board of governors. Such action shall be communicated in writing to the
associated within fifteen days thereafter.
Dated: December 1, 1960.
being all of the associates of the association.
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